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InTroducTIon
Carbon reduction projects follow a cycle that includes conceptualization, due diligence, implementation, documentation, audit or validation, and finally certi-
fication, with the eventual issuance of verified, serialized car-
bon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets. To fulfill 
this process, there are several technical elements that must be 
addressed: monitoring or measurement, reporting, and verifica-
tion (“MRV”), permanence (i.e. ensuring the project’s duration), 
leakage (i.e. addressing negative and identifying positive offsite 
impacts), and additionality.
Additionality is a test that a carbon reduction project must 
meet to ensure the project would not have been implemented 
without the revenue of the carbon markets.1 This test of addi-
tionality must be satisfied if the project is being submitted to the 
voluntary carbon markets—for which, voluntary buyers want to 
be ensured their donations actually matter for a project—or to 
the compliance markets since buyers need to be confident that 
regulators will accept their carbon reduction purchase.
It is important to further note that all of the most prominent 
carbon reduction certification standards—again, whether a com-
pliance market under the Kyoto Protocol or an internationally 
recognized voluntary standard—require some type of addition-
ality test. This includes, but is not limited to, the following cer-
tification standards: the American Carbon Registry (“ACR”),2 
Center for Resource Solutions (“CRS”),3 Green-e Climate 
Protocol for Renewable Energy,4 Chicago Climate Exchange 
(“CCX”),5 Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”),6 Climate 
Action Reserve (“CAR”),7 Climate, Community and Biodiver-
sity Standard (“CCBS”),8 Gold Standard,9 Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (“RGGI”),10 and the Verified Carbon Standard 
(“VCS”).11
Additionality is an important requirement because if non-
additional (i.e. “business-as-usual”) projects are eligible for car-
bon finance, then the net amount of greenhouse gas emissions 
will continue to increase and the environmental integrity of car-
bon reduction projects will be called into question. For example, 
if a project was already far exceeding its industry average return 
on investment and was implemented over fifty years ago when 
no carbon markets existed, why should this particular project 
also be eligible for additional revenue from the carbon markets? 
Similarly, if an activity was legally required, then why should 
this activity of a regulated entity also be eligible for additional 
revenue from the carbon markets? The challenge with addition-
ality, however, is that one must prove a counterfactual argument 
(i.e. what would have otherwise happened in the absence of a 
project) to ensure the project provides carbon reductions that 
would not have otherwise occurred. This article explores the dif-
ferent concepts of additionality, while acknowledging its con-
troversial elements and proposing inclusion of some important 
considerations to ensure net emissions reductions.
leGal or reGulaTory addITIonalITy
Legal additionality, or what is sometimes referred to as 
regulatory additionality or surplus, is perhaps the most objec-
tive type of additionality. If a law exists and a given activity 
is regulated, then the project is most likely not eligible for car-
bon finance. Therefore, for a project to meet the legal addition-
ality standard, it must provide carbon reductions beyond those 
required by law.12
To put this in context, the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) regulates large municipal solid waste (“MSW”) 
landfills, and according to the Climate Action Reserve’s Landfill 
Project Protocol Version 3.0, “[t]here are several EPA regula-
tions for MSW landfills that have a bearing on the eligibility of 
methane collection and destruction projects as voluntary GHG 
reduction projects.”13
Two challenges with legal additionality are that on one 
hand, the concept might create perverse incentives, and on 
the other hand, sometimes following the law is not common 
practice. With the first idea in mind, the Montreal Protocol is 
an international treaty designed to phase out the production of 
ozone depleting substances (“ODS”).14 While the United States, 
Canada, and European nations have phased out the production 
of hydrofluorocarbons (“HFC”), which are ODSs and green-
house gases, the largest contributor of certified emission reduc-
tions (“CER”) under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development 
Mechanism are from HFC projects in China and India.15 Since 
legal additionality would rule out the eligibility of HFC proj-
ects hosted in China and India if these countries were to pass 
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domestic laws eliminating the production of HFCs, they have 
little incentive to begin regulating HFCs. If they did pass regu-
lations, China and India would experience a reduction of for-
eign investment towards the purchase of these carbon reduction 
credits and would need to use their own public funds to phase 
out HFCs. Due to the perception that manufacturers are actually 
producing excess HFCs, the European Union Emission Trad-
ing Scheme will no longer accept these HFC reduction credits 
beginning in 2013.16 Another example of this legal additional-
ity challenge is the tough predicament a government might face 
when contemplating the passage of a strict feed-in tariff or an 
aggressive renewable portfolio standard. Such a passage would 
effectively legally require an increase in renewable energy pro-
duction, however, there would be fewer carbon reduction credits 
from these renewable energy sources eligible for purchase from 
international buyers.
On the second challenge of additionality, there are legal 
reserve requirements on private property in Brazil. Depending 
on the region (e.g. Amazon Region versus Cerrado Region), a 
landowner is restricted from using twenty to eighty percent of 
his or her land.17 However, it is a somewhat common practice—
particularly in the remote Amazon—to illegally clear forests 
from the legal reserve.18 Now, if such practices are deemed to be 
common, should legal additionality still apply and thus prevent 
the reforestation of this fallow land using carbon finance?
Corruption also presents challenges for ensuring the legal 
additionality of a project. There are currently carbon reduc-
tion projects either certified or under development in Ethiopia, 
Nicaragua, the Philippines, Kenya, and Venezuela.19 Yet, Trans-
parency International’s Global Corruption Report 2009 rates 
Ethiopia as the 126th most corrupt country out of 180 countries, 
Nicaragua as the 134th, the Philippines as the 141st, Kenya as 
the 147th, and Venezuela as the 158th.20 Where projects provide 
much needed financing in developing countries with already 
corrupt infrastructures, there may be a disincentive to upgrade 
or improve legal frameworks that could reduce the number of 
carbon reduction projects.
The evolving regional compliance carbon markets of the 
U.S.—which are the Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”), the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the Mid-
western Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (“Accord”)—have 
Canadian Provinces and Mexican States as either participants 
or observers.21 As these regional programs transform, it will be 
interesting to see how state or national laws, and thus legal addi-
tionality, will be applied.
common pracTIce or TechnoloGIcal 
addITIonalITy
Common practice additionality, which could incorporate 
either the technological or market penetration of a given project 
type based on its geography, is another objective additionality 
test. The aspect of geography is important because what is prev-
alent in one location—for example, wind turbines in Texas or 
solar photovoltaic systems in California—might not be so preva-
lent in other locations (i.e. such as New Hampshire or Alaska). 
According to the American Carbon Registry’s standard, com-
mon practice is determined by whether there is “widespread 
deployment of the project . . . within the relevant geographic 
area.”22 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard defines it as one 
which is “not common practice in the sector/region, compared 
with projects that have received no carbon finance.” 23
Yet, how does one define common practice and what spe-
cifically would be the particular geographic focus (i.e. a coun-
try, state, local electric grid)? Perhaps one of most controversial 
examples surrounding common practice was the Chicago Cli-
mate Exchange’s acceptance of soil conservation carbon reduc-
tion projects (i.e. also known as no-till), which were previously 
enrolled in the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Conservation 
Reserve Program.24 Under this program, farmers were rewarded 
by the purchase of their carbon reduction credits for activities 
that they were already undertaking without revenue from the 
carbon markets.25 If a regulated industry is allowed to emit 
greenhouse gas emissions because they are supporting non-addi-
tional carbon offset projects, then the environmental integrity of 
the system should be called into question because the net green-
house gas emissions will continue to increase. Climate Action 
Reserve (“Reserve”) aptly points out that there are many dif-
ficulties in actually defining the common practice of a region. 26
According to Derek Six, the Portfolio Manager for Environ-
mental Credit Corporation, the best assessment of additionality 
would be the use of a market penetration approach.27 Such an 
approach, which is similar to common practice, would incor-
porate knowledge and technology barriers to implementation, 
along with financial aspects of additionality.28 For example, 
agricultural methane destruction or agricultural methane gas-to-
energy projects are only installed on about 0.5% of U.S. farms.29 
Thus under a market penetration approach, all agricultural meth-
ane destruction and agricultural methane gas-to-energy proj-
ects would be eligible for carbon finance whether or not there 
were projects clustered in a specific region (e.g. California) or 
whether a particular project had a slightly higher financial return 
(i.e. financial additionality).
FInancIal addITIonalITy
Many carbon market participants are averse to the concept 
of financial additionality, which is much more subjective than 
legal additionality or common practice. Likewise, financial 
additionality is difficult to determine due to matters of confiden-
tiality, proprietary internal business decisions, and the potential 
use of arbitrary metrics. The Clean Development Mechanism, 
which refers to financial additionality as the investment analy-
sis, considers whether the project would have been financially 
attractive without the revenue from carbon reduction credits.30
The Verified Carbon Standard considers financial addition-
ality, which it defines as an investment barrier and a subset of 
implementation barriers.31 The American Carbon Registry also 
considers financial additionality a subset of implementation bar-
riers and asks whether funding from carbon reduction credits 
will incentivize the project’s implementation.32
SuStainable Development law & policy17
Confidential and proprietary internal business matters that 
make financial additionality a subjective and difficult assess-
ment include, but are not limited to:
•	 Capital	 budgeting	 decisions	 (i.e.	which	 projects	will	 get	
funded and why?)
•	 Financing	 sources	 (e.g.	 banks,	 internal	 funds,	 venture	
capitalists)
•	 Portfolio	of	available	projects	(i.e.	what	alternative	invest-
ments/projects are possible?)
•	 Required	 internal	 rate	of	 return	(“IRR”),	 return	on	assets	
(“ROA”), return on equity (“ROE”), and/or payback 
period (i.e. which metric does a firm use and what is the 
requirement?)
While the Clean Development Mechanism has an extensive 
discussion on appropriate metrics for financial additionality 
(i.e. discount rates and benchmarks), arbitrary metrics such as 
the following could be used as justification for allowing or not 
allowing a project to count as eligible for carbon finance:
•	 Companies	of	the	same	size	(e.g.	in	terms	of	money	and/or	
employees)
•	 Geographical	 location	 (e.g.	 country,	 sub-national,	 local	
electric grid)
•	 Length	of	time	company	is	in	business
•	 Public	vs.	private	ownership
This said, how do you compare a small, specialized renewable 
energy company to a large, diversified provider? Similarly, do 
start-ups differ from “well-established” companies enough 
to present a challenge when comparing financial additionality 
thresholds? Also, how does the ownership structure (i.e. non-
profit, limited liability corporation, type C corporation, public-
owned entity, joint-ownership) impact financial decisions and 
thus, financial additionality?
Applying financial additionality across a broad spectrum 
of project types is another significant challenge, posing many 
serious questions. Likewise, why should carbon markets reward 
projects that demonstrate the poorest financials? If two different 
projects existed and with one thousand dollars, one could reduce 
one thousand metric tons of carbon dioxide and the other could 
reduce one hundred metric tons, why should the one hundred 
metric tons project be considered more financially additional? 
On the other hand, why reward projects that already have “supe-
rior” returns and that existed before the formation of carbon 
markets (i.e. a question which relates to voluntary buyers want-
ing their donations to matter)?
Financial additionality should be phased out of future certi-
fication standards and new revisions of current certification stan-
dards, a position supported by Green-e Climate.33
projecT-by-projecT addITIonalITy
Under the project-by-project test for additionality, each proj-
ect individually undergoes a series of additionality tests accord-
ing to the given standard. Two main standards, which apply a 
project-by-project additionality test, are the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism and the Verified Carbon Standard. The Clean 
Development Mechanism is the carbon reduction standard for 
Certified Emission Reductions (“CER”) for the Kyoto Proto-
col’s international compliance market.34 In contrast, the Verified 
Carbon Standard is the leading voluntary carbon markets stan-
dard, in terms of market share, and has adopted methodologies 
from the CDM.35
Essentially, project proponents—whether referring to inves-
tors, project developers, landowners or buyers—need to assess 
whether each and every individual project meets the additional-
ity tests. Such a process can be expensive, time-consuming (i.e. 
reduces scalability and time-to-market), and difficult for both the 
general public and local communities to grasp. Furthermore, it is 
difficult for auditors to determine an individual project’s subjec-
tive assertions, especially with regard to financial additionality.
perFormance or secToral addITIonalITy
Many current and evolving certification standards—includ-
ing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western Cli-
mate Initiative, and the Climate Action Reserve—are adopting 
performance or sectoral approaches to additionality. Essentially, 
such performance or sectoral approaches use a uniform addition-
ality test or benchmark, which could be based on an industry or 
geographic region. It is important to note, the same additionality 
criteria—such as legal, common practice/technology, and finan-
cial—can be applied to a performance or sectoral approach, the 
main difference is that such criteria are not uniquely applied to 
each single project. Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (“RGGI”) offset projects may not be government ordered 
projects, may not receive incentives from RGGI auction pro-
ceeds, and must meet certain requirements to qualify.36
Recent discussions of the WCI indicate that it will attempt 
to set a standardized baseline for offset protocols that reflect 
the strictest regulatory and legal requirements.37 The Climate 
Action Reserve uses standardized performance based tests for 
additionality because they are administratively easier to imple-
ment and less subjective.38
For the level of scalability required to address global cli-
mate change, there needs to be a near-full transition to sectoral 
or performance benchmarks for additionality. To this end, one 
of the decisions made at the sixteenth session of the Conference 
of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change in Cancun, Mexico, was for the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism to work towards standardized baselines and 
additionality tests.39 Similarly, the Verified Carbon Standard 
has convened a steering committee, which is developing “VCS 
requirements and guidance on performance benchmark and 
technology test approaches to baselines/additionality.”40
conclusIon
Carbon reduction credits, also known as carbon offsets, are 
an effective cost-containment mechanism and have the potential 
to produce greenhouse gas reductions alongside a host of co-
benefits (e.g. local jobs, technology transfer, reforesting critical 
wildlife habitat). However, the general public, regulators, and 
environmentalists do not want to hear, “well we were already 
doing the project and we are doing nothing different, but now 
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we are getting revenue from the carbon markets.” To ensure 
overall reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, additionality is 
a useful technical tool to ensure the integrity of carbon reduction 
projects, but certification standards should be less concerned 
about financial additionality and more focused on transitioning 
to sectoral or performance approaches.
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